Colorado State Supreme Court 2 East 14th Street Denver, Colorado  80203	▲Court Use Only▲
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO                                                       Plaintiff v.   STEVE D. GARTIN                                                          Defendant
	Regarding: Lower Court’s Neglect to Rule   Case Number 00CR3371   Division 2       CourtRoom: 5A
Defendant in Propria Persona[1]:      Steve Gartin      P.O. Box 16700      Golden, Colorado  80402 Email: sheriffsteve@justice.com
1st Amendment Petition for Redress of Grievance in the nature of a Petition for DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comes now, Steve Douglas, Gartin, child of הּוֹהּיּ[2](YHVH[3]), a sovereign Inhabitant[4] of the California Republic, currently unlawfully imprisoned in Colorado on excessive bond; First Secured Party of the “strawman[5] defendant” – a cestui que trust[6] - in the above captioned matter and “attorney-in-fact” firmly established pursuant to U.C.C. Private Security Agreement #SDG09112000-SA, registered, and uncontested, with the Secretary of STATE U.C.C. Division, appearing by special visit, not general appearance, in propria persona (pro-se); who is of legal age, sound mind, speaks the truth and has first hand knowledge of the facts contained herein; affirms and attests that the following information is true, correct, complete, not misleading and is made under the penalty of perjury, knowingly, willingly and without threat or coercion hereby states for the record:

 

Petitioner, Steve Douglas, Gartin is a Proper Party[7] to the above titled action, without a BAR attorney, and moves the Honorable Court to make a Declaratory Judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. Article 51 known as the "Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law" on the following questions which could afford Petitioner RELIEF from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to his RIGHTS, status, or other legal relations and may prevent further damage.

 

Petitioner seeks clarification concerning “Fiction of Law[8],” and his relationship and duties to such fiction.  Petitioner has endeavored to lawfully and properly “redeem” the “Strawman transmitting utility” charged as “defendant” in the above entitled matter by U.C.C. Private Security Agreement #SDG09112000-SA [See Attachment: Exhbit # 1] and to adhere and to abide by the Law of the Land in all good faith.  Petitioner, however, is unsure if it is right and proper to joinder a “fiction of law” and has therefore reserved all unalienable rights by entering ONLY special visits to the District Court.  All filings with the District Court have been in the nature of First Amendment Petitions and Notices in the form of “motions” that were in acceptable format to the forma required by the Honorable District Court.  Each filing has notice of the Petitioner’s Standing and Capacity as a freeborn Inhabitant of the California Republic in full possession of all unalienable rights granted by the Creator, הּוֹהּיּ

 

R                 Questions: 

1.      Does the District Court have the authority to seize jurisdiction of a sovereign Inhabitant of the California Republic, in California, by deploying Federal Quasi-military troops in disguise as FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION S.W.A.T. Team based on a defective, unsigned warrant from Jefferson County?

2.      Can Jefferson County Sheriff’s department extradite a person without a waiver of extradition?

3.      Can District Court seize jurisdiction of an action involving an Inhabitant of a foreign nation or a minister of a foreign government?

4.      Can Denver District Court set an excessive, to-wit: $100,000.00 bond in a matter in which they have never exercised jurisdiction?

5.      Can Jefferson County Detention Facility hold a foreign California Inhabitant without a valid warrant of commitment?

 

Petitioner is an unwilling Party to the above titled action by means of force of arms, unlawful arrest, fraud, kidnapping, threat, duress, coercion, and by collusive joinder.  Petitioner has never willingly and intentionally joindered with the First Judicial District Court[9] and has never waived extradition from California, Common Law Venue, Right to Speedy Trial, Right to know the cause and nature of the Charges, or any other God-Given and Constitutionally secured Rights.[10]  Petitioner has suffered grievous and great injury and damages as the DIRECT result of the Statutes[11] or Ordinances in Question, to-wit:

&           18-5-114.  Offering a false instrument for recording. (1) A person commits offering a false instrument for recording in the first degree if, knowing that a written instrument relating to or affecting real or personal property or directly affecting contractual relationships contains a material false statement or material false information, and with intent to defraud, he presents or offers it to a public office or a public employee, with the knowledge or belief that it will be registered, filed, or recorded or become a part of the records of that public office or public employee. (2)  Offering a false instrument for recording in the first degree is a class 5 felony. (3)  A person commits offering a false instrument for recording in the second degree if, knowing that a written instrument relating to or affecting real or personal property or directly affecting contractual relationships contains a material false statement or material false information, he presents or offers it to a public office or a public employee, with the knowledge or belief that it will be registered, filed, or recorded or become a part of the records of that public office or public employee. (4)  Offering a false instrument for recording in the second degree is a class 1 misdemeanor.

In case #00CR3371 this statute has been curiously and vaguely applied to the lawful act of filing of mechanic’s liens pursuant to the lawful and proper exhaustion of all available administrative remedies in a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract, prior to proceeding to litigation.

 

It is Petitioner’s current understanding that a lien is not an instrument, by legal definition.  Researching “words & phrases” and statutory definitions led Petitioner to:

R                 Statutory Construction:  Instrument

&           C.R.S. 4-3-104.  Negotiable Instrument. (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, “negotiable instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:

&           (3) (b) “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument.

 

 

Official Comment:

&                           1.  The definition of “negotiable instrument” defines the scope of Article 3 since Section 3-102 states:  “This Article applied to negotiable instruments.”  The definition in Section 3-104(a) incorporates other definitions in Article 3.  An instrument is either a “promise” as defined in Section 3-103 (a)(9), or “order” defined in Section 3-103(a)(6).    Thus, the term “negotiable instrument” is limited to a signed writing that orders or promises payment of money. 

R                 Definitions:  Black’s Law – Sixth Edition:

&           Include: to shut up, keep within.  “Including” within statute is interpreted as a word of enlargement or of illustrative application as well as a word of limitation.  Premier Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or. 123, 400 P.2d 227, 228.

&           Instrument:  A formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease.  A writing that satisfies the requisites of negotiability prescribed by U.C.C. Article 3.  A negotiable instrument (defined in U.C.C. §3-104), or a security (defined in U.C.C. §8-102) or any other writing which evidences a right to payment of money and not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.  U.C.C. § 9-105 (1).

&           Indorsement: The act of a payee, drawee, accommodation indorser, or holder of a bill, note, check, or other negotiable instrument, in writing his name upon the back of the same, with or without further or qualifying words, whereby the property in the same is assigned and transferred to another.  U.C.C. § 3-202 et seq.

&           Assign:   To transfer, make over, or set over to another.  To appoint, allot, select, or designate for a particular purpose, or duty.  To point at, or point out; to set forth, or specify; to mark out or designate; to particularize, as to assign errors on a writ of error; to assign breaches of a covenant.

&           Assignment.  The act of transferring to another all or part of one’s property, interest, or rights.  A transfer or making over to another of the whold of any any property, real or personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein.  It includes transfers of all kinds of peoperty.  (Higgins v. Monckton, 28 Cal.App.2d 723, 83 P.2d 516, 519), including negotiable instruments. 

&           Offering:  An issue of securities offered for sale to the public or private group.  Securities offerings are generally of two types: primary (proceeds going to the company for some lawful purpose) and secondary (where the funds go to a person other than the company; i.e. selling stockholders). 

&           False Instrument:  A counterfeit; one made in the similitude of a genuine instrument and purporting on its fact to be such.

&           False and fraudulent:  To amount to actionable “false and fraudulent representations”, they must have been as to existing fact or known by one making them, from his superior knowledge, to have been untrue when made.  Burlison v. Weis, Mo.App., 152 S.W.2d 201, 203.

Ü                Part 2: Spurious Liens and Documents

38-35-201: Definitions.  As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:

            (2)        “Lien” means an encumbrance on real or personal property as security for the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

&           (3)           “Spurious document” means any document that is forged or groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise patently invalid.

&           (4)           “Spurious lien” means a purported lien or claim of lien that:        (a) Is not provided for by a specific Colorado or federal statute or by a specific ordinance or charter of a home rule municipality;            (b) Is not created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by the owner of the property it purports to encumber; or   (c) Is not imposed by order, judgment, or decree of a state court or a federal court.

&           For purposes of satisfying the definition of “spurious document” under subsection (3), a document is “groundless”  for which a proponent can advance no rational argument based on evidence or the law to support the claim of a lien.  Westar Holdings partnership v. Reece, 991 P.2d 328 (Colo.App.1999).

Colorado Revised Statutes § 38-35-202.  Recording or filing.

&           (1)           Any state or local official or employee, including the clerk and recorder of any county or city and county and the Colorado secretary of state, may accept or reject for recording or filing any document that the state or local official or employee reasonably believes in good faith may be a spurious lien or spurious document.

&           (2)           No state or local official or employee, including the clerk and recorder of any county or city and county and the Colorado secretary of state, shall be liable to any person or claimant for either the acceptance or rejection of recording or filing of any document that the state or local official or employee reasonably believes in good faith may be a spurious lien or spurious document.

&           (3)           No state or local official or employee, including the clerk and recorder of any county or city and county and the Colorado secretary of state, shall be obligated to accept for recording or filing any lien or claim of lien against a federal official or employee or a state or local official or employee based upon the performance or nonperformance of that official’s or employee’s duties unless such lien or claim of lien is accompanied by a specific order issued by a state court or federal court authorizing the recording or filing of such lien or claim of lien.

§ 38-35-203.  Action to enforce.

&           (1)  No spurious lien or spurious document shall hold or affect any real or personal property longer than thirty days after the lien or document has been recorded or filed in the office of any state or local official or employee, including the office of the clerk and recorder of any county or city and the county or the office of the Colorado secretary of state, unless within the thirty days:

&           (a) An action has been commenced to enforce such lien or document in the state district court for the county or city and county in which the lien or document was recorded or filed or the federal district court in Colorado; and

&           (b) A notice of lis pendens stating that such an action has been commenced is recorded or filed in the office where the lien or document was recorded or filed.

&           (2)  The notice of lis pendens require by paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section must comply with the requirements of section 38-35-110 and rule 105 (f) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure and must include the civil action number of the action that has been commenced to enforce the lien or document.  Failure to comply with the requirements of this subsection (2) shall render the notice of lis pendens invalid.

 

            No where in the Colorado Revised Statutes can petitioner find the term “false lien” or “fraudulent lien.”  This statute appears to be the foundation of the unauthorized prosecution of #00CR3371 by the State Attorney General’s Office, but yet no mention of those terms appears in the statute or any where that Petitioner can find.

 

R                 Questions:

1.      Is a mechanics lien an “instrument” pursuant to C.R.S. 18-5-114?

2.      The liens at issue were filed on 12 June, 2000 and expired 30 days later.  Was any further action by anyone required to “remove those liens if no Lis Pendens was filed within 30 days as required by statute?

3.      Can a Clerk and Recorder refuse or decline to file a mechanic’s lien, as the statute suggests?

4.      Can a First Amendment Petition for redress of grievance be grounds for criminal prosecution?

5.      Can there be a crime where there is no injured party?

______________________________________________

 

Petitioner is confused and unsure concerning the definitions of several terms used by the Prosecution in case #00CR3371, and suspects that foul play, fraud and criminal activity may have been perpetrated upon the Accused in that matter. 

            In contemplation of future legal action against various perpetrators of criminal acts against this Petitioner, it is the intent of this Petitioner to consistently operate within both the Law of the Land[12] and statutory provisions for the STATE OF COLORADO and above all, within the Spirit of the Law[13] of הּוֹהּיּ(YHVH) as codified in the 10 Commandments and amplified by YahShewa, Messiah in the New Covenant, to which this Petitioner is party.[14] [See EndNote # [i] ]

 

Therefore: the Petitioner hereby Petitions the Honorable Court for a Ruling pursuant to Rule 51 defining the proper procedure for seeking redress of grievance against public officials for breach of contract relative to their Oath to support and defend the Constitution and to protect this Petitioner’s constitutionally secured rights as required by their solemn oath[15] and public responsibility. 

 

The specific public officials considered for legal process are:      ð

 

Petitioner has not yet provided the herein named public officials, except those noted by asterisks, with Petition for Redress of Grievance[16] in the Nature of a Private International Remedy Demand and full Notice & Grace and Opportunity to Correct, but those who have been provided such lawful process have initiated a malicious prosecution against the Petitioner by unlawfully converting the First Amendment Right to Redress of Grievance into a charge in matter #00CR3371, to-wit:

&           18-8-306 Attempt to influence a public servant.  “Any person who” attempts to influence any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal against any person or property, with the intent thereby to alter or affect the public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by him or the agency or body of which he is a member, commits a class 4 felony.

Petitioner seeks to TEST the VALIDITY of the preceding  Statute or Ordinance relative to Constitutional guarantees of Due Process of Law, and the Bill of Rights enumerated in the Constitution of the United States of America as Amendments One through Ten inclusive and specifically as to the statutory construction in relation to Article One in Amendment and the Colorado Constitution[17] at Article II, §§ One through Twenty Nine inclusive and specifically as to the statutory construction in relation to §10.

 

Petitioner has investigated the footnotes in the Colorado Revised Statutes, page 1029 of Volume 6 under the statute 18-8-306 and is referred to People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994).  Under Key 5. Constitutional Law 90.1 (1) and Extortion and Threats 25.1 the statute as applied in this case was not seen to be overly broad facially because the conduct proscribed in this particular case rose to the level of criminal culpability. 

 

However, in case #00CR3371 there is no allegations of threats, only of penalties for unconstitutional and criminal actions on the part of government agent Gary Clyman.  It is obvious from the context of the First Amendment Petition for Redress of Grievance at issue that any such penalty would first have to be adjudicated before applied and then the collection process would have to run its lawful course.  The Petitioner has never had any intention to “lien” Mr. Clyman’s property.  [See Attachment Exhibit # 2]

 

The Petition clearly states that it is a good faith effort to exhaust all administrative remedies.  It is the current understanding of the Petitioner that this is the prescribed method for resolving grievances where the government’s agents have acted egregiously and outrageously outside of the constitutional boundaries of their official position.  Good Faith Notice and Grace have been tendered to the perpetrators of atrocities against the Plaintiff by virtue of their color of STATE authority and no attempt at mitigation or reconciliation have been forthcoming.  The only response has been to continue the unlawful and unconstitutional persecution of the Petitioner.

 

The malicious and vindictive prosecution of the Petitioner in this matter has had a chilling effect on the freedom to exercise the Right secured by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, § 10 of the Colorado Constitution. 

 

            Petitioner can determine no substantial compelling government interest that would justifiably protect the criminal and unconstitutional actions of its agents and the Petitioner is unsure and confused as to what the proper method for Redress of Grievance actually is.

 

&           D.Virgin Islands 1989.  Standard for evaluating regulations of conduct that have incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms is that restriction can be no greater than is essential to furtherance of governmental interest that is being protected.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.1.  Moorhead v. Farrelly, 723 F.Supp. 1109.

It is confusing to the Petitioner to understand what the compelling government interest is in protecting COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE Investigator Gary Clyman while he engages in blatantly unlawful[18] and unconstitutional activities as are enumerated in Petitioner’s First Amendment Petition for Redress of Grievance [See Attachment: Exhibit #2].

 

Petitioner seeks clarification of the statutes enumerated above and statutory notice of exactly what conduct is proscribed before continuing with any legal action against the above enumerated criminal government actors.  Petitioner seeks to in all ways obey the law!

 

þ                 The Petitioner’s stated intent from the beginning of the Ten Year Legal Odyssey culminating in the action now before the Colorado State Supreme Court is to protect, maintain and defend the God-Given and Constitutionally protected liberty interests[19] that form the foundation of all property Rights to which this Petitioner is Heir, by hereditary entitlement and which this Petitioner intends to pass intact to future generations of Gartins.[20]  If that intent is proscribed, Petitioner adjures the Honorable Supreme Court to so declare and to provide a logical explanation for the suspension of the People’s God-Given right to protect and defend their liberty.

 

Petitioner is further confused and unsure of the usage of the term “person.”  42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 & 1986 have many references to what IS and IS NOT a “PERSON” pursuant to those titles and there is a great deal of reference to the 14^th Amendment.  Since Petitioner, as a matter of conscious and religious conviction[21], stands upon the Original Constitutions[22] of the united States, California[23] and Colorado[24] as his foundation of contractual agreement with government, there arises several questions about whether the Petitioner is a “person” or “legal fiction” at all and a very relevant question about whether any of the statutes at issue in case #00CR3371 apply even if they had been properly applied[25] in all other regards.

 

Part 4: Definitions

&           C.R.S. § 2-4-401: Definitions: (8) “Person” means any individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, limited liability company, partnership, association, or other legal entity.

&           At the very least, reading the statute in this way is not so clearly indicated that it provides reason to depart from the often-expressed understanding that “in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.”  Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941)). See also United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947)

&           (14) “State”, when applied to a part of the United States, includes any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof, and any area subject to the legislative authority of the United States of America.

&           (15)  “United States” includes all states, the District of Columbia, and the territories, commonwealths, and possessions of the United States.

 

R                 18-12-105: Unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon – unlawful possession of weapons.

(1) “A person” commits a class 2 misdemeanor if such person knowingly and unlawfully:

(a) Carries a knife concealed on or about his or her person; or

 

(2) It shall not be an offense if the defendant was:

(b) A person in a private automobile or other private means of conveyance who carries a weapon for lawful protection of such person’s or another’s person or property while traveling; or

 

Police reports of the unlawful arrest by Lakewood S.W.A.T. Team of three peaceful Inhabitants traveling in a private conveyance by means of a “Felony Traffic Stop” to serve purported unsigned misdemeanor warrants establish the fact that Petitioner was (2)(b) NOT committing any offense. 

 

R                  Question:

            1. How can Plaintiff be charged with an offense when the facts establish the statutory defense?

 

Petitioner seeks to TEST the VALIDITY of the preceding  Statute or Ordinance relative to Constitutional guarantees of Due Process of Law, and the Bill of Rights enumerated in the Constitution of the United States of America as Amendments One through Ten inclusive and the Colorado Constitution at Article II, §§ One through Twenty Nine inclusive. The Colorado Supreme Court having ruled that Colorado provides its Citizens even greater guarantees of personal freedom than the Federal Constitution. 

 

Constitutions only secure and guarantee the freedom which was granted by YHVH by constraining the government from encroachment upon those God-Given Rights.

 

1 Peter 2:9  But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people; that ye should shew forth the praises of Him who hath called you out of darkness into His marvelous light;

 

1 Peter 2:10  Which in time past were not a people, but are now the People of God: which had not obtained mercy, but now have obtained mercy.

 

1 Peter 2:11  Dearly beloved, I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul;

 

1 Peter 2:12  Having your conversation honest among the Gentiles: that, whereas they speak against you as evildoers, they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God in the day of visitation.

 

            Yet, the Apostle Peter warns the Parties to the New Covenant not to use freedom as a pretense to commit evil, to-wit: 1 Peter 2:16  “As free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God.”  Petitioner is bound by contract to a more stringent authority than mere statutes or constitutions.

 

Humbly Submitted in good faith,           

                                   

                                                                                                Wednesday, December 05, 2001

_______________________________________

Steve D. Gartin – In Propria Persona – Sui Juris

 

 

Certificate of Service by Jefferson County Detention Facility Staff – Jail Mail and the U.S. Postal Service to the Colorado State Supreme Court

 

I, Steve D. Gartin, undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing,  PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT was delivered to the Jefferson County Detention Facility Staff Mail System on this 11^th  day of the Twelfth month in the Year of our Lord Two Thousand and One:

 

The Court:

Clerk of the supreme Court                               The Honorable Leland P. Anderson

Mac V. Danford                                               First Judicial District

2 East 14^th Street – 4^th Street                            100 Jefferson County Parkway

Denver, Colorado  80203                                 Golden, Colorado  80401

 

Exhibits:

Exhibit #1:  U.C.C. Private Security Agreement #SDG09112000-SA

Exhibit #2:  First Amendment Petition for Redress of Grievance

 

EndNotes